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305 
Law Student Debt + Public Interest Career  
= Character and Fitness Fail 
Annie Legomsky

 
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the state bar’s 
decision to deny Hassan Jonathan Griffin admission to the bar on 
character and fitness grounds.
1
 Mr. Griffin had graduated from law 
school in May 2008.
2
 Since graduating, he had successfully registered 
for admission to the Ohio bar three times, but had failed the bar 
examination on each occasion.
3
 Meanwhile, he had accrued $170,000 
in student loan debt and $16,500 in consumer debt, and had not made 
any payments on his loans since graduation.
4
 The Court reasoned that 
Mr. Griffin’s plan to continue working part-time in the public 
defender’s office, in the hope that it would lead to a full-time position 
upon passage of the bar exam, was not a feasible debt repayment 
plan.
5
 The Court implicitly suggested that Mr. Griffin should instead 
have sought more lucrative work, such as returning to his former 
profession as a stockbroker, and perhaps declaring bankruptcy to 
discharge his consumer debt.
6
 The Court found that Mr. Griffin had 
“neglected his personal financial obligations”7 and had “no plan or 
 
 
 J.D., M.S.W. (2014), Washington University School of Law and George Warren 
Brown School of Social Work; B.A. (2007), University of San Francisco. I would like to thank 
three professors who helped me formulate and refine my arguments in this Note: Prof. Brian 
Tamanaha, whose teaching inspired me as a 1L and whose advocacy around issues of 
contemporary legal education provided an essential jumping-off point for this Note; Dean 
Michael Piel, who so generously reviewed my drafts and provided invaluable edits, feedback, 
and policy suggestions; and lastly, my dad, Prof. Stephen Legomsky, for being my sounding-
board and chief advisor throughout the writing process, as well as in life. 
 1. In re Application of Griffin, 128 Ohio St. 3d 300 (Ohio 2011). 
 2. Id. at 301.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. at 301–02. 
 5. Id. at 303. 
 6. Id. at 301–03. 
 7. Id. at 303. 
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ability to pay these debts.”8 Ultimately, the Court denied Mr. 
Griffin’s application to take the bar at that time.9  
The Griffin case reveals an increasingly common problem in 
today’s legal environment. How should a court balance the 
importance of assuring the financial reliability and responsibility of 
future attorneys against the realities of high tuition levels, rising 
student debt, the shortage of legal jobs, and the need for public 
interest lawyers? 
Part I of this Note provides a background of the standards that 
Ohio and other states apply in determining whether an applicant has 
the requisite character and fitness to gain admission to the bar, and 
the laws and policies that govern those standards. It will also examine 
the current state of law student debt and the legal job market. Part II 
analyzes the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to deny Mr. Griffin 
admission to the bar. It contends that, while it did not arbitrarily deny 
Mr. Griffin admission to the bar on character and fitness grounds, the 
result was nonetheless unjust because current character and fitness 
standards are not consistent with the realities of current legal 
employment opportunities and public policies supporting public 
interest employment. This Note proposes that the standards 
governing the character and fitness review process should be 
modified to (1) provide for more uniformity across jurisdictions; 
(2) explicitly require consideration of an applicant’s debt and 
repayment plan in the context of the current economic and legal 
employment climates; (3) reflect avowed policy interests in 
promoting public interest legal employment; and (4) diversify the 
membership of decision-makers to provide for review based on more 
culturally, professionally, and experientially diverse perspectives.   
 
 8. Id. at 302. 
 9. The Court left open the possibility of Mr. Griffin reapplying at an unspecified later 
date. Id.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the Griffin Case 
When Hassan Jonathan Griffin applied for admission to the bar to 
take the February 2010 bar exam, the Columbus Bar Association 
Admissions Committee reviewed his application and interviewed 
him.
10
 Thereafter, in December 2009, the Columbus Bar Association 
Admissions Committee reported to the State Board of Commissioners 
on Character and Fitness (“the Board”) that Mr. Griffin possessed the 
requisite character and fitness to practice law in Ohio, and 
recommended he be approved for admission to the bar.
11
 
The Board, however, had concerns about Mr. Griffin’s debt and 
initiated a sua sponte investigation.
12
 Three members of the Board 
conducted a panel hearing in May 2010.
13
 The panel found that Mr. 
Griffin had worked as a stockbroker for several years before 
attending law school, “earning enough money to meet his 
expenses.”14 The panel also found that “[s]ince completing his first 
year of law school, however, [he] has worked part-time, 24 to 32 
hours a week, at the Franklin County Public Defender’s Office, 
earning $12 per hour.”15 The panel noted that Mr. Griffin was living 
with his nine-year-old daughter and her mother in the mother’s home, 
and he was making minimal financial contributions to household 
expenses.
16
 During this time, Mr. Griffin had not been able to make 
any payments on his student loans, which had become due in July 
2009,
17
 nor had he been able to make payments on his credit cards 
 
 10. Id. As is standard procedure, Mr. Griffin was also interviewed by the admissions 
committee at this time. Id.; OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R. 1, § 11(C)(3). 
 11. Griffin, 128 Ohio St. 3d at 301. In Ohio, the local admissions committee performs the 
first line of character screening, followed by a review by the Board. The Supreme Court of 
Ohio has the final decision-making power upon appeal by an applicant. OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR 
R. 1, §§ 10(B), 12(B). See also infra Part II.B.3.a. 
 12. Id. The investigation was conducted pursuant to Griffin, 128 Ohio St. 3d at 301. See 
infra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns about board 
composition. 
 13. Griffin, 128 Ohio St. 3d at 301.  
 14. Id. at 301–02. 
 15. Id. at 302. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
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since December 2008.
18
 Additionally, one creditor secured a default 
judgment against him.
19
 
The panel recommended to the full Board that Mr. Griffin be 
denied admission to the bar, “[n]oting that the applicant has no plan 
or ability to pay these debts.”20 The Board agreed with the panel and 
also recommended that Mr. Griffin be disapproved, with permission 
to reapply for a later examination date.
21
 
Mr. Griffin appealed the Board’s recommendation to the Supreme 
Court of Ohio.
22
 The Court agreed with the Board’s recommendation. 
In a cursory opinion, the court simply summarized the Board’s 
findings and conclusions, noting that:  
[Mr. Griffin had] neglected his personal financial obligations 
by electing to maintain his part-time employment with the 
Public Defender’s Office in hope that it will lead to a full-time 
position upon passage of the bar exam, rather than seeking 
full-time employment, which he acknowledges would give him 
a better opportunity to repay his obligations and possibly 
qualify him for an additional deferment of his student-loan 
obligation.
23
 
B. Overview of the Character and Fitness Requirement 
1. Premises and Justifications for Screening for Character 
The general requirement of moral character for a professional 
lawyer can be traced back to Roman Theodesian Code.
24
 Informal 
and inconsistent requirements of “virtue,” often demonstrated by 
personal references, were maintained in the American legal system 
from the colonial period through the 19th century.
25
 Character 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 300. 
 23. Id. at 303. 
 24. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character As A Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 
493 (1985). 
 25. Id. at 496–98. 
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screening became more formalized in the late nineteenth century, and 
many states instituted character interviews with committee 
oversight.
26
 During this time, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
and other organizations led the campaign for higher professional 
standards.
27
 The effort was “aimed in principle against incompetence, 
crass commercialism, and unethical behavior.”28 
By the 1930s, character certification had become more systematic, 
although “gross inadequacies in the structure, resources, and 
jurisdiction of oversight remained.”29 Legal ethics scholar Deborah L. 
Rhode undertook a comprehensive review of the character screening 
process in her 1985 article Moral Character as a Professional 
Credential.
30
 In addition to questioning the effectiveness of character 
screening,
31
 Professor Rhode highlighted concerns about the 
compositions of screening boards.
32
 At the time of her review, 
government and public interest lawyers were underrepresented on 
screening boards, as were attorneys under age 35.
33
 Today, character 
screening for lawyers is an established part of the bar licensing 
process, but many of the problems identified in historical criticisms 
remain.  
There are two chief justifications for character certification in the 
legal profession: to protect the public and to preserve the 
profession.
34
  
 
 26. Id. at 498–99. Many other professions also experienced an increase in character 
screening and professionally licensing during this time. Id.  
 27. Id. at 499. 
 28. Id. (quoting MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 173 (1977)). Historically, the discretionary nature of the process 
made it subject to abuses, and it was often used to validate discrimination. Candidates who were 
found to be lacking in moral character were more likely to be denied based on their foreign 
nationality or Jewish roots than any legitimate characteristic. Id. at 499. 
 29. Id. at 502. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 555–64. 
 32. Id. at 505–06. 
 33. Id. Professor Rhode found that there was little representation of lawyers employed in 
academic, public interest, and government practice, and that “[screening] committees may also 
be skewed toward established, mainstream practitioners.” Id. at 505–06. In regard to the age of 
reviewing members, while 40 percent of the bar was under age 35, that age group was only 
represented in 16 percent of review positions. Id. at 505–06.  
 34. Id. at 507–09. 
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Courts and scholars often agree that the public needs protection 
from unscrupulous attorneys who would abuse their clients’ trust, 
such as through misappropriation of funds or breaking client 
confidences.
35
 Another concern is that attorneys will “subvert” justice 
by promoting perjury or misrepresentation.
36
 
Character and fitness requirements are also frequently justified on 
grounds that they are necessary to preserve the professionalism of the 
legal community.
37
 Negative stereotypes about lawyers are 
widespread.
38
 For the profession to survive, its members and their 
conduct must be regulated. Character and fitness standards are one 
aspect of the bar’s ability to regulate would-be attorneys.39  
Whether or not the character and fitness process is actually 
effective in screening for future attorney misconduct, it is possible 
that the mere existence of these procedures helps improve public 
confidence in attorneys. In other words, one of the purposes of the 
character and fitness process is to preserve the appearance of 
professionalism in the legal industry.
40
 This justification may be one 
of the more salient rationalizations for the character and fitness 
 
 35. Id. at 508. 
 36. Id. at 509. 
 37. Many scholars have criticized the common assumptions that the character and fitness 
process actually works as designed to keep the most risky law graduates out of the guild and 
thereby enhance the professionalism of the bar. See, e.g., id. at 555–63. Indeed, as late at the 
mid-1980s, no controlled research had been conducted to test the effectiveness of the character 
and fitness process, and this author has not discovered any such research since. Id. at 556. Nor 
had any state bar even performed a review of its disciplinary records to identify any predictive 
factors of poor character. Id.  
 38. Public opinion polls, as well as common themes in literature and humor reflect these 
stereotypes of the lawyer as greedy, arrogant, and willing to do anything to win. Id. at 510–11. 
 39. Another mechanism of the profession’s self-regulation is found in the ABA’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“MPRC”), but these primarily operate apply to attorneys post-
certification. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012). Several of the MPRC rules are 
related to one’s character for handling finances. Rule 1.1 prescribes that an attorney be 
competent. Id. at R. 1.1. Two relevant elements of the competence requirement are those of 
thoroughness and preparation. Id. Rule 1.5 provides direction on how and when attorneys may 
handle fees. Id. at R. 1.5. Rule 1.8 prohibits an attorney from taking advantage of a client in a 
financial or business relationship. Id. at R. 1.8. Rule 1.15 states that an attorney shall not mingle 
clients’ funds and outlines proper handling of client property. Id. at R. 1.15. In addition to 
outlining certain actions prohibited by membership in the Bar, the MRPC also defines general 
attributes that constitute misconduct. This includes engaging in conduct “involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or “that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”. Id. at 
R. 8.4(c)-(d). 
 40. Rhode, supra note 24, at 510–11.  
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certification process. A more critical explanation for the character 
and fitness procedures also exists: the appearance of moral oversight 
legitimates the profession’s ability to self-regulate.41 
Despite the aforementioned justifications for having character and 
fitness screening, the scheme is not without its fair share of criticism. 
The scope of the character and fitness rules has been criticized as 
being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. One concern is that 
certain character and fitness standards are so broad that they are 
arbitrarily applied.
42
 Mr. Griffin’s case may serve as an illustration of 
this view. Others argue that any character failings of attorneys who 
have passed the character test demonstrate that the current standards 
are not stringent enough.  
2. State Variation 
While all states require bar applicants to demonstrate that they 
possess good character and moral fitness, the requirements are not 
standardized. This has led to significant variation among the states as 
to what constitutes the requisite character to practice law.
43
 Evidence 
of the variation between states can be found in the different rates and 
types of denial of bar applications.
44
 An applicant may be denied on 
 
 41. This, too, is an assumption that has been questioned. Id. at 511. Whether the bar’s 
desire to improve its public appearance is motivated by the more noble purpose of assuring 
attorney credibility and the subsequent functioning of the justice system, is up for debate. There 
are certainly selfish motivations behind the effort—to preserve the bar’s autonomy, as well as to 
maintain the economic monopoly the bar has on the practice of law. Id. at 511. 
 42. See generally id. at 511.  
 43. For example, in some states, such as Texas and Mississippi, a felony conviction will 
disqualify an applicant for admission, while in other states it is merely a factor in the decision. 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO 
THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2013 CHARACTER AND 
FITNESS DETERMINATIONS 5 (Erica Moser & Claire Huismann eds., 2012) [hereinafter GUIDE]. 
Another example is that some states provide for conditional or qualified admissions, while 
others do not. Id. Ohio, for example, does not permit conditional admission, while several other 
states, including Arizona, Indiana, and New Jersey, do permit conditional admission. Id. at 4–5. 
These states permit conditional admission where there are concerns about an applicant’s debt, 
substance abuse, mental disability, or criminal history. Id.  
 44. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, A MODEL FOR 
DIALOGUE: A MEETING MANUAL ON CHARACTER AND FITNESS ISSUES FOR BAR EXAM’RS AND 
LAW SCHOOLS, 28, 41–43 (rev. Aug. 2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/model_dialogue.authcheckdam.pdf. See 
also, Rhode, supra note 24, at 532–37. 
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character and fitness grounds in one state and then successfully pass 
the test in another.
45
  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the ambiguity of 
the term “moral character,” describing it as having “shadowy rather 
than precise bounds.”46 Justice Black dissected the dangers of using 
such a vague term:  
The term ‘good moral character’ has long been used as a 
qualification for membership in the Bar and has served a useful 
purpose in this respect. However the term, by itself, is 
unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited 
number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the 
attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a 
vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal 
views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for 
arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice 
law.
47
 
Recognizing the need for some uniformity in the bar admissions 
context, in 2012 The National Conference of Bar Examiners and the 
ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar joined 
forces to publish the Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission 
Requirements.
48
 This guide includes the Code of Recommended 
Standards for Bar Examiners (“The Code”), which was made for the 
purpose of providing “guidance and assistance [in the hope that] they 
will lead toward uniformity of objectives and practices in bar 
admissions throughout the United States.”49 
 
45. Indeed, after Ohio denied Mr. Griffin admission to the bar, he moved to Arizona, where 
he passed the bar (and has since retained his license). Telephone Interview with Eric Brehm,, 
Esq., Licensed Practicing Attorney, Brehm & Associates, LPA (Oct. 15, 2012). 
 46. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 249 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Tyler R. Martinez, The Effects of Student Loan Debt on 
Bar Admission–Recalibrating the “Good Moral Character” Requirement, 14 T.M. COOLEY J. 
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 37, 39 (2011) [hereinafter Martinez]. 
 47. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 262–63 (1957). 
 48. GUIDE, supra note 43.  
 49. CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS (2012) (see GUIDE, supra 
note 43). 
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The Code provides three notable procedural suggestions.
50
 First, 
that character and fitness standards should be “articulated and 
published.”51 Second, “[s]tandards should be applied in a consistent 
manner and interpretive material should be developed in furtherance 
of this objective.”52 And finally, that bar examiners should rotate 
sufficiently often “to bring new views to the authority.”53 
3. The Ohio Admissions Process 
a. Decision Makers 
In Ohio, local bar admissions committees, who are appointed by 
the local bar association president, make the first recommendations 
about whether applicants should be approved as having the requisite 
character and fitness.
54
 These committees report their findings along 
with their recommendations to the State Board of Commissioners on 
Character and Fitness (“the Board”).55 The Board is comprised of 
twelve attorneys, each of whom is appointed by the Ohio Supreme 
Court.
56
 The Board’s responsibilities include supervising and 
directing the local admissions committees in investigating applicants’ 
character and fitness.
57
 To accomplish this task, the Board has 
various powers, including the power to establish rules of procedure, 
“promulgate . . . standards of conduct”, and instigate sua sponte 
character and fitness investigations.
58
 
 
 50. There are also substantive guidelines in the Code. Among these is a list of thirteen 
factors to be considered in making a character and fitness determination, similar to the fifteen-
factor list in Ohio’s Rules. CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS III, 13 
(2012); OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R. 1, § 11(D)(3). See also infra notes 68–71 and accompanying 
text.  
 51. CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS § III, 9 (2012). Many 
states do not currently publish their character and fitness standards and therefore they are not 
easily available, if at all, to the public. GUIDE, supra note 43, at 5. 
 52. CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS § III, 9 (2012).  
 53. CODE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR BAR EXAMINERS § I, 2 (2012).  
 54. OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R. 1, §§ 11(A), (B).  
 55. Id. § 11(B).  
 56. Id. § 10(A)(1).  
 57. Id. § 10(B)(2).  
 58. Id. The Board may also refer matters to regional or local admissions committees and 
direct them to investigate applicants further and report back to the Board. Id. 
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Ultimately, while the local admissions committees conduct the 
investigations and make recommendations about whether applicants 
should be approved as having the requisite character and fitness, the 
Board decides whether or not to actually recommend an applicant for 
admission to the bar.
59
 In cases where the Board recommends that an 
applicant not be approved, it is required to make a report about the 
proceedings, including any appeals hearings and its findings of fact, 
to the Supreme Court.
60
 The final decision is made by the Supreme 
Court, which will enter an order on the matter.
61
  
b. The Rules 
The Supreme Court of Ohio based its decision to deny Mr. Griffin 
admission to the bar on Rule I of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for 
the Government of the Bar (“the Rules”).62 The Rules require that 
applicants to the bar be approved as possessing “the requisite 
character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the 
practice of law.”63 Section 11 outlines the substantive and procedural 
requirements on which admissions committees base their 
determinations.
64
  
 
 59. Id. § 10(B)(4).  
 60. Id. § 12(E). Once the report and record are filed with the Supreme Court, applicants 
are afforded the opportunity to object to the Board’s findings or recommendations. Id. § 12(F).  
 61. Id. § 12(G). It is a rare case where the Supreme Court of Ohio reverses the Board’s 
recommendation to deny an applicant admission to the bar. In fact, between 1993 and 2005, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio only reversed a Board recommendation for denial once (out of the 
forty-eight reviews it conducted). Supreme Court of Ohio, supremecourt.ohio.gov Character 
and Fitness Determinations, Statistics, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttySvcs/ 
admissions/cfstats/default.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). The lone case where the applicant was 
approved by the Court despite the Board’s recommendation that she be denied involved an 
applicant who, despite having engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, was approved 
anyway because the extent of applicant’s unauthorized practice of law was through inadvertent 
title representations in her letterhead, she did not intentionally mislead anyone, and applicant 
had ceased using the inappropriate title. In re Application of Stage, 81 Ohio St. 3d 554, 556, 
559 (1998). 
 62. OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R. 1. 
 63. Id. § 1(D). Applicants must meet the character and fitness requirements before they 
will be allowed to take the bar exam. Id.  
 64. OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R. 1. § 11. The burden of proof in establishing the requisite 
character and fitness lies with the applicant. Id. § 11(D)(1). The standard is proof in Ohio is “by 
clear and convincing evidence.” Id. “Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard 
of proof that is more than the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in most civil cases 
and less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard used in criminal cases.” 32A C.J.S. 
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Admissions committees may recommend an applicant for 
approval if “the applicant’s record of conduct justifies the trust of 
clients, adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional 
duties owed to them and demonstrates that the applicant satisfies the 
essential eligibility requirements for the practice of law as defined by 
the Board [of commissioners on character and fitness].”65 In the 
reverse, the Rules state than an applicant may be denied if his/her 
record reflects “a significant deficiency in the honesty, 
trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability of the applicant.”66 The Rules 
specify that admissions committees should “carefully” consider 
fifteen potentially disqualifying factors before making a 
recommendation about an applicant’s character and fitness.67 
Whether the applicant has demonstrated a “neglect of financial 
responsibilities,” the issue Mr. Griffin was rebuked for, is among 
these potentially disqualifying factors.
68
 
Some of the other fifteen factors are more representative of what 
might come to mind when imagining the character traits that would 
prevent one from pursuing a career in law. These include whether the 
applicant has committed or been convicted of a crime,
69
 whether the 
applicant has an existing or untreated chemical dependency,
70
 or 
whether there is evidence that the applicant has engaged in “[a] 
pattern of disregard of the laws.”71  
 
Evidence § 1624 (2008). Evidence is found to be clear and convincing evidence if the factfinder 
believes the truth of the assertions to be “highly probable or reasonably certain.” Id. A 
consequence of the burden of proof lying with the applicant is that an applicant may be denied 
simply by a “failure to provide requested information . . . or otherwise cooperate in 
proceedings”. OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R. 1 § 11(D)(1).  
 65. Id. § 11(D)(3).  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. § 11(D)(3)(k). Other factors include whether the applicant violated the honor code 
or engaged in academic misconduct at his or her school; practicing law when “unauthorized”; 
having a mental or psychological disorder that affects the applicant’s ability to competently 
practice law; failing to provide “complete and accurate” information about one’s past; making 
false statements; “acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”; abusing the 
legal process; neglecting professional obligations; violating a court order; being denied 
admission to another state’s bar on character and fitness grounds; and being subjected to 
disciplinary action by a legal or professional agency. Id. § 11(D)(3). 
 69. Id. § 11(D)(3)(a).  
 70. Id. § 11(D)(3)(b).  
 71. Id. § 11(D)(3)(f). 
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The mere presence of any of the fifteen factors is not a sufficient 
basis for the panel to deny the applicant admission to the bar. Instead, 
such a finding triggers a more in-depth analysis of the “weight and 
significance to the applicant’s prior conduct.”72 This analysis is 
undertaken in order to provide a determination about whether the 
applicant’s present character and fitness qualify him or her for 
admission to the bar.
73
 This analysis also calls for a factor-based 
inquiry.
74
 The admissions committee considers factors including the 
recentness of the conduct, the seriousness of the conduct, factors 
underlying the conduct, evidence of rehabilitation, positive social 
contributions of the applicant since the conduct, and the applicant’s 
candor in the admissions process.
75
  
In addition to following the requirements under the Rules for 
character investigations, admissions committees must also make their 
decisions in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States and the Supreme Court of Ohio.
76
 
4. Limits on the Rules: Due Process and Equal Protection 
State supreme court rules on character and fitness for admission to 
the bar are subject to federal constitutional requirements.
77
 The Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution are a source of guidance on the state 
regulation of professional memberships.
78
 Together, the clauses 
provide that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person . . . 
 
 72. Id. § 11(D)(4).  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. § 11(D)(4)(b)-(e),(g)-(i). The other factors are the age of the applicant at the time 
of the conduct, the cumulative effect of the conduct, and the materiality of any omissions or 
misrepresentations. Id. § 11(D)(4)(a),(f),(j).  
 76. OH SUP. CT. GOV. BAR R.1, § 11(D)(2).  
 77. Id. § 11(D)(2). 
 78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs. of New 
Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957) (“A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of 
law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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the equal protection of the laws.”79 Included among those rights is the 
right to pursue employment.
80
  
Arbitrary or capricious regulation of admission to certain 
professional bodies may violate rights under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.
81
 The Supreme Court of the United States 
considered the limits of state regulation of admission to the bar in the 
landmark case Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico.
82
 
The Schware Court explained that states may set high standards for 
qualification to practice law, including having “good moral 
character.”83 These requirements, however, must “have a rational 
connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law.”84 
 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 80. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121–22 (1889). In Dent, the Court discussed the 
applicability of the Due Process Clause to state regulation of licensing medical professionals, as 
well as vocations in general as a “source of livelihood”: 
It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful 
calling, business, or profession he may choose . . . This right may in many respects be 
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions . . . All [vocations] 
may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great 
learning for their successful prosecution. The . . . right to continue their prosecution—
is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any 
more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. But there is no arbitrary 
deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure to 
comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection of society . . . The 
nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the 
judgment of the state as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or 
profession . . . no objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency or 
difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling or profession . . . that 
they can operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.  
Id.  
 81. See Schware, 353 U.S. 232; see also Dent, 129 U.S. at 121–22. The Court in Schware 
refrained from examining whether pursuit of the practice of law is a right or a privilege within 
the requirements for a due process claim. It found that question to be unnecessary because the 
more pertinent issue presented was the validity of the reasons the State relied upon in reaching 
their decision to deny the applicant admission to the bar. Schware, 353 U.S. at 251 n.5. 
 82. 353 U.S. at 239. The issue was whether New Mexico’s denial of an applicant for bar 
licensure based on his prior membership in the Communist Party, as well as his prior use of 
aliases and a record of arrests, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Id. The Court held that the applicant’s denial was a violation 
of his due process rights. Id. at 247. 
 83. Id. at 239. 
 84. Id. (citing Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 
Wall. 277, 319–20 (1866)). For example, “an applicant could not be excluded merely because 
he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church.” Id.  
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Additionally, even when a standard might be rationally related to the 
practice of law, state officers cannot apply those standards to exclude 
an applicant from the practice of law when there is no basis for a 
finding that the applicant does not possess the necessary qualities, or 
when such exclusion is discriminatory.
85
  
In his concurring opinion in Schware, Justice Frankfurter explored 
how certain moral characteristics are rationally related to the practice 
of law:  
One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of 
after-dinner speeches to affirm that all the interests of man that 
are comprised under the constitutional guarantees given to 
‘life, liberty and property’ are in the professional keeping of 
lawyers. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer's 
responsibility in our society that he stands ‘as a shield,’ to 
quote Devlin, J., in defense of right and to ward off wrong. 
From a profession charged with such responsibilities there 
must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high 
sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance 
of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, 
been compendiously described as ‘moral character.’86 
5. Financial Irresponsibility 
Applicants may be denied admission to the bar for neglecting their 
financial responsibilities, since one’s intention to pay one’s debts 
reflects respect for the law and for personal obligations. Additionally, 
because attorneys must often hold their clients’ funds in trust, how 
they handle their own finances may be relevant in determining 
whether they will be diligent or trustworthy in holding their clients’ 
funds responsibly.
87
 An attorney in dire financial straits may be 
tempted to “either to short-shrift [his] clients or . . . convert money 
from [his] clients to take care of those debts.”88  
 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 87. Martinez, supra note 46, at 39, 46. 
 88. Terri C. Harris, Student Loan Default Could Result in License Revocation, 46 TENN. 
B.J. 14, 16 (2010) (citing Santulli v. Tex. Bd. Of Law Exam’rs, No. 03-06-00392-CV, 2009 
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Inquiries into bar applicants’ financial responsibility are therefore 
appropriate. They do, however, present multiple concerns. Chief 
among those concerns is the effectiveness of these inquiries in 
predicting poor moral character. Student loan debt, for example, has 
not been shown to be predictive of poor future conduct, but is still 
invoked as a reason to deny applicants admission to the bar.
89
  
A second concern is the subjectivity of the bar admission 
decision-making process. The resulting judicial inconsistency impairs 
the notice that prospective and current students need to avoid 
problematic behavior, particularly with respect to law school debt.
90
 
This is particularly troublesome because decisions to attend law 
school and incur high debt loads are made years before the character 
and fitness review. Law schools and law school rankings 
publications, such as U.S. News and World Report, have been 
criticized for providing less than transparent data on job placement, 
debt, and salary figures for recent graduates.
91
 Indeed, numerous 
scholars, the legal academy, Senator Barbara Boxer, and the ABA 
have highlighted these problems.
92
  
Courts have used a variety of approaches to analyze bar 
applicants’ financial responsibility. Some courts have stressed the 
student’s efforts to repay the debt, rather than the amount of the debt, 
in assessing financial responsibility. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
found an applicant was eligible for admission to the bar despite 
 
WL 961568, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 10, 2009)). 
 89.  Stanford University professor Deborah L. Rhode has commented, “[t]he key thing 
that the character process is designed to do, which my research says it doesn’t do very well, is 
predict based on past conduct what future conduct will be . . . Just the fact that you’ve taken out 
large amounts of loans at a time that you have no income, is not predictive [of poor future 
conduct].” Jonathan D. Glater, Again, Debt Disqualifies Applicant from the Bar, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/business/27lawyer.html?_r=0 [hereinafter 
Glater, Again]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD 
REPORT RANKINGS, SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR (July 15, 
2010), http://ms-jd.org/files/f.usnewsfinal-report.pdf; see also Core Issues, LAW SCHOOL 
TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/reform/issues/#Employment_Outcomes 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2014). 
 92. See, e.g., Debra Cassens-Weiss, Sen. Barbara Boxer Accuses ABA of Taking ‘Half 
Measures’ to Collect Better Job Stats, A.B.A.J., Oct. 6, 2011, available at http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/sen._barbara_boxer_accuses_aba_of_taking_half_measures_to_collect_ 
better_jo/.  
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defaulting on his student loans, on the condition that he enter into a 
loan rehabilitation agreement to repay his debt.
93
 For similar reasons, 
the Ohio Supreme Court denied an applicant who had only $3,500 in 
debt because, it reasoned, the applicant had no justification for failing 
to resolve his debts and had a “pattern of leaving jobs without having 
any meaningful job prospects in place.”94  
In contrast, other courts place greater weight on the sheer size of 
the applicant’s debt. Robert Bowman’s case was highly publicized 
when he was denied admission to the New York bar for having 
$480,000 in student debt.
95
 Despite his enormous debt load, the 
admissions committee had recommended his admission after finding 
that he had “exceptional character,” based on his history of 
overcoming personal obstacles.
96
 Additionally, Bowman had 
presented evidence that he was a victim of fraudulent servicing of his 
private loans, and that he had contacted other creditors to work out a 
repayment plan.
97
 Still, a reviewing court denied him admission to 
the bar on the basis of neglect of personal finances.
98
 
Still other decisions seem to be more concerned with the 
applicant’s ability to quickly repay his or her debt, rather than the 
 
 93. In re Thomas, 761 So. 2d 531 (La. 2000). 
 94. In re Kline, 116 Ohio St. 3d 185, 185–86 (2007).  
 95. In re Anonymous, 67 A.D.3d 1248 (2009); see also, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Unpaid Student Loans Derail Law Grad’s Quest for NY Bar Admission, A.B.A.J., July 2, 2009, 
available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/unpaid_student_loans_derail_law_grads_ 
quest_for_ny_bar_admission; Jonathan D. Glater, Finding Debt a Bigger Hurdle than the Bar 
Exam, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/02lawyer.html 
[hereinafter Glater, Finding]; Glater, Again, supra note 89. 
 96. Letter from Beth Davies Carpinello, Esq., James M. Conboy, Esq. & Cynthia 
Feathers, Esq., Subcommittee Members, to Committee on Character and Fitness (Jan. 23, 
2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/report-on-robert-
a-bowman-s-application-for-admission-to-the-new-york-state-bar/original.pdf; Jack Marshall, 
Robert Bowman: Aspiring Lawyer, Ethics Martyr, ETHICS ALARMS BLOG (Nov. 27, 2009, 
2:50pm), http://ethicsalarms.com/2009/11/27/robert-bowman-aspiring-lawyer-ethics-martyr/. 
Mr. Bowman moved through the foster care system as a child and struggled through community 
college, four-year university, and then graduate school and law school. Along the way, he 
almost lost his leg in an accident. It took him six years of rehabilitation to learn to walk again. 
Upon graduation from law school, Mr. Bowman repeatedly took the New York bar exam, 
persisting through multiple failures. He finally passed the New York bar on his fourth try, when 
he was met with his ultimate barrier to admission on character and fitness grounds. Glater, 
Finding, supra note 95. 
 97. Glater, Finding, supra note 95. 
 98. In re Anonymous, 67 A.D.3d 1248 (2009).  
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reason for or the amount of that debt. In one such case, much like Mr. 
Griffin’s case, the decision to deny admission to the bar involved a 
graduate who was working part-time in a public service legal job and 
had plans to repay his debt.
99
 Another example is found in In re 
Holbrook, in which the Ohio Supreme Court denied Melinda 
Holbrook admission to the bar based on her family’s pending 
bankruptcy.
100
 The Court found that Holbrook’s husband’s gambling 
losses, which he had concealed from Holbrook, “significantly 
contributed to the family’s financial downfall.”101 Despite 
recognizing that Holbrook was not fully aware of her family’s 
financial troubles before starting law school, nor was she personally 
culpable for her family’s debt, the court denied her admission to the 
bar.
102
  
Notably, some denials that were formally grounded on financial 
irresponsibility might actually have reflected findings of other 
shortcomings. Many of these decisions, for example, turn on the 
applicant’s candor during the character and fitness process.103 
Similarly, applicants have also been censured for financial 
irresponsibility in connection with the character trait of 
trustworthiness.
104
 
Apart from concerns over effectiveness and consistency, a third 
problem with financial irresponsibility review is the weight courts 
assign to certain financial indicators in comparison to other, 
seemingly more compelling, character criteria. “[C]ourts have 
overlooked misconduct like lawyers’ solicitation of minors for sex, 
[and] efforts to deceive judges and possession of cocaine,” while 
public interest-minded applicants like Mr. Griffin are denied for 
 
 99. See, e.g., In re Ford, 110 Ohio St. 3d 503 (2006).  
 100. In re Holbrook, 116 Ohio St. 3d 248 (2007). 
 101. Id. at 251. 
 102. Id. This is not to say that the court erred in making this decision. It’s arguable that the 
court legitimately applied the rules as a device to protect the public. If being in serious debt 
may relate to one’s trustworthiness for handling client funds, then culpability may be beside the 
point. 
 103. See, e.g., In re Application of Bland, 93 Ohio St. 3d 414 (2001) (finding applicant’s 
failure to provide information about his defaulted student loans and plans to repay them upon 
the Bar Committee’s request warranted his denial). 
 104. See Kosseff v. Bd. of Bar Exam’r, 475 A.2d 349 (Del. 1984) (denying applicant on 
character and fitness grounds because, even though he had repaid his debt in full, the 
procurement of the loan was itself fraudulent). 
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having high, but not unheard of, levels of debt.
105
 Additionally, 
character and fitness review, which is designed to predict and thereby 
prevent future misconduct, may result in harsher consequences for 
the applicants than do actual instances of financial misconduct, such 
as diversion of funds, committed by already licensed attorneys.
106
 
C. Current Trends in Legal Employment and Student Debt 
Judgments about good moral character require comparison to 
other similarly situated people, as well as consideration of one’s 
environment. This is especially important when questions about one’s 
character are examined during a time of extreme change, such as 
during a recession. As Professor Brian Tamanaha points out in his 
recent critique of the legal education model, Failing Law Schools, the 
early 2000s have seen extreme changes in the cost of legal education, 
student debt levels, and legal employment prospects.
107
  
The cost of a legal education has skyrocketed over the last few 
decades. From 2005 to 2011, for example, the cost of tuition at Mr. 
Griffin’s alma mater, The Ohio State University Moritz College of 
Law, rose 69 percent for residents and 44 percent for non-residents.
108
 
That is a 46 percent or 25 percent increase over the rate of inflation, 
respectively.
109
 Increasing tuition costs are common across the states. 
Public law school tuition has increased by approximately 10 percent 
each year since the late 1980s, while inflation rose by only 3 percent 
each year.
110
 At the same time, living expenses now range from 
approximately $15,000 to $27,000 annually.
111
  
 
 105. Glater, Finding, supra note 95. 
 106. Harris, supra note 88, at 16. “Meaning in a ludicrous sense, attorneys may be better 
off stealing the money to pay back their student loans rather than defaulting on them.” Id.  
 107. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 
2012).  
 108. Matt Leichter, The Law School Tuition Bubble Data: Tuition Increases Law School-
by-Law School from 2005 to 2011, LAW SCHOOL TUITION BUBBLE BLOG (Jan. 22, 2011), 
http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2011/01/22/the-law-school-tuition-bubble-data-
tuition-increases-law-school-by-law-school-from-2005-to-2011/#OH. 
 109. Id. 
 110. TAMANAHA, supra note 107, at 108. Tuition has also risen at private schools, though 
not quite as dramatically as at public schools. Id. From 1985 to 2009, the average public law 
schools’ tuition rose 820%, from $2,006 to $18,472. Id. 
 111. Paul Campos, The Cost of Living, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM BLOG (June 19, 
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Tuition alone fails to paint a full picture of how a legal education 
is financed today. The key indicator is how much debt a student can 
expect to have upon graduation. In 2010, the average law student 
debt was $98,500 for 85 percent of graduates from ABA-accredited 
law schools.
112
 Resident graduates of Ohio State who pay full tuition 
and do not have other financial support, such as savings, will 
graduate with an average debt of $179,233.
113
 Ohio State students 
without in-state discounts will average a debt level of $236,087 at 
graduation.
114
 On the national level, approximately 50 percent of U.S. 
law students paid “full sticker price” for law school in recent years.115 
Like tuition, debt levels alone paint an incomplete picture of a recent 
law graduate’s financial future. Debt levels can be fully appreciated 
only when viewed in light of a graduate’s ability to repay his or her 
debts—whether through employment or loan repayment assistance 
programs.  
Employment rates for law graduates have been in serious decline 
since the early 2000s.
116
 As recently as 2007, nearly 77 percent of law 
graduates were employed in legal jobs.
117
 In 2011, however, the 
National Association of Legal Professionals (NALP) reported that 
just 65 percent of law graduates were employed in full-time, long-
term jobs that require a J.D.
118
 Law School Transparency reported 
 
2012), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/06/cost-of-living.html. 
 112.  William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long 
Will It Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Bills?, 98 A.B.A.J. 30, 30–31 (2012), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_law_school_bubble_how_long_will_it_last_if
_law_grads_cant_pay_bills/ [hereinafter Henderson & Zahorsky, Bubble]. This figure is 
probably much lower than actual debt figures because it was based on what schools report to 
U.S. News and World Report. Those figures typically do not include the loan-based interest fees 
often added to tuition charges. See Non-Discounted Cost of Attending Law School, LAW 
SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/reform/projects/Non-
Discounted-Cost/ [hereinafter Law School Transparency, Non-Discounted].  
 113. School Profiles, Ohio State University Profile, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, 
http://www.lstscorereports.com/schools/osu/costs/2014/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) [hereinafter 
Law School Transparency, School]. Adjustments for inflation would put this figure at 
approximately $171,554.97 when Mr. Griffin graduated from Ohio State in 2008. CPI Inflation 
Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. 
 114. Law School Transparency, School, supra note 113. 
 115. Law School Transparency, Non-Discounted, supra note 112.  
 116. TAMANAHA, supra note 107, at 117. 
 117. Id. at 73. 
 118. NALP, CLASS OF 2011 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, THE ASSOCIATION FOR LEGAL 
CAREER PROFESSIONALS, (July 2012) http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:305 
 
 
that only 58 percent of 2011 graduates from Ohio State reported full-
time employment in a job requiring a J.D.
119
 Tamanaha expects this 
trend to continue for some time.
120
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
predicts that there will be only about 25,000 legal job openings each 
year through 2018, while the number of graduates has recently 
averaged approximately 45,000 per year.
121
  
Those who secure employment still face lower salaries than their 
counterparts did in prior years. According to the ABA, only 8 percent 
of 2011 graduates found full-time positions that required a law degree 
at firms with over 250 lawyers, where the highest salaries can be 
found.
122
 In contrast, approximately one-half of the 2010 law 
graduates earned between $40,000 and $65,000.
123
 The median 
starting salary for a 2010 law graduate was just $63,000, a decrease 
of approximately 13 percent from the median starting salary in 
2009.
124
  
 
2011.pdf. Another 12.5% were reported to be in “JD Advantage” jobs. Id. Overall, NALP 
reported 12.1% of graduates were unemployed. Id. Of those who reported which sector they 
were employed in, 67.6% were employed in the private sector; 31.7% were employed in the 
public sector. Id. Even these figures are likely overstatements, both because law schools report 
misleading information about their graduates’ employment outcomes, and because the 
regulating bodies compile the information differently. TAMANAHA, supra note 107, at 144. 
Additionally, schools have been engaging in the practice of hiring some of their own graduates 
into short-term positions (“bridge positions”), which enables the schools to count more 
graduates as “employed” at the time they report their figures nine months post-graduation. 
Bernie Burk, Employment Outcomes IV: What the ABA Employment Outcomes Data Tell Us 
About the Prevalence and Distribution of School-funded “Bridge” Positions, THE FACULTY 
LOUNGE BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/04/ 
employment-outcomes-iv-what-the-aba-employment-outcomes-data-tell-us-about-the-prevalence-
and-distri.html. 
 119. Law School Transparency, School, supra note 113. The percentage of 2009 graduates 
from Ohio State with full-time, long-term legal jobs was slightly higher in 2009, reported at 
66.5%. Id.  
 120. TAMANAHA, supra note 107, at 139.  
 121. Id. (citing Employment by Occupation, 2008–2018, Employment Projections 
(Washington, DC: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010), table 1.2), http://www.bls.gov/ 
emp/ep_table_102.pdf.). 
 122. Rachel M. Zahorsky, When the Data Differs, Whose Job Stats Should Would-be Law 
Students Trust?, A.B.A.J., Sept. 20, 2012, available at http://www.abajournal.com/ 
lawscribbler/article/when_the_data_differs_whose_jobs_stats_should_would-be_law_students_ 
trust/.  
 123. TAMANAHA, supra note 107, at 112.  
 124. Henderson & Zahorsky, Bubble, supra note 112; Debra Cassens-Weiss, Average 
Starting Pay for Law Grads Is on Downward Shift; Drop Is Largest for Law Firm Jobs, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/14
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Some new lawyers will be able to take advantage of loan 
repayment programs. Federal student aid programs that assist law 
graduates with lower starting salaries include the Income-Based 
Repayment Program (IBR) and Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
(PSLF). IBR generally benefits those students with high debt and 
modest income.
125
 IBR allows students who qualify to make 
payments in the amount of 15 percent of the difference between their 
adjusted gross income and 150 percent of the poverty level.
126
 After 
twenty-five years of payments, the remaining federal debt will be 
forgiven.
127
 Under the PSLF program, graduates using IBR who work 
in public service may have their remaining loans forgiven in ten 
years.
128
 Unlike IBR, which is provided for the purpose of making 
debt “manageable,” PSLF was created to encourage public service.129 
In addition to federal repayment programs, some law schools and 
some states offer Loan Repayment Assistance Programs (LRAPs). 
School-based LRAPs are typically funded by private individuals to 
encourage graduates to pursue public service employment.
130
 
Students are required to work in a qualifying position and for a 
certain period of time, at the completion of which the school may 
forgive all or part of the student’s LRAP loan.131 About half of the 
 
A.B.A.J., July 6, 2011, available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/average_starting_ 
pay_for_law_grads_is_on_downward_shift_drop_is_largest_for/.  
 125.  Income-Based Repayment Plan for the Direct Loan and FFEL Programs, FEDERAL 
STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/income-based-repayment.pdf (last 
updated Mar. 2012) [hereinafter Federal Student Aid, Income-Based]. 
 126. TAMANAHA, supra note 107, at 119; Federal Student Aid, Income-Based, supra note 
125. 
 127. Federal Student Aid, Income-Based, supra note 125. Note that IBR and other federal 
forgiveness programs do not cover private debt. 
 128. Federal Student Aid, Income-Based, supra note 125; Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness, FED. STUD. AID, http://www.studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/ 
charts/public-service (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Federal Student Aid, Public). 
 129. Federal Student Aid, Public, supra note 128. In 2003, the ABA Commission on Loan 
Repayment and Forgiveness published Lifting the Burden: Law Student Debt as a Barrier to 
Public Service. The Commission recognized the importance of federal, state, and private loan 
repayment and forgiveness programs and recommended expansions of those programs. ABA 
COMMISSION ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT 
DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE 7, 11–13 (2003).  
 130. Rev. Rul. 2008-34, 2008-28 I.R.B 76. 
 131. Id. 
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states also provide LRAPs.
132
 State programs vary considerably as to 
which jobs qualify, how much assistance is provided, and who 
administers and funds the program.
133
 Of the twenty-four current state 
LRAPs, only ten consider work as a public defender, as was Mr. 
Griffin’s case, to meet eligibility requirements.134  
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Did Ohio err in Denying Mr. Griffin Admission to the Bar? 
Questions as to character and fitness necessarily entail broad 
discretion, and I do not argue here that the Ohio Supreme Court 
abused that discretion in denying Mr. Griffin admission to the bar. 
The Court’s rationale is consistent with the factors defined in the 
Rules, i.e., that Mr. Griffin neglected his financial responsibility by 
incurring $170,000 in debt and defaulting on his payments post-
graduation. Arguably, Mr. Griffin’s decision to continue working 
part-time at the public defender office rather than pursuing other, 
full-time employment, supported the Court’s doubt of his diligence 
and reliability. 
That is not to say that the Court should not have approved Mr. 
Griffin’s application to the Ohio bar. Much of the inquiry into Mr. 
Griffin’s character and fitness was speculative and predictive. The 
Court could have found that it was most wise for Mr. Griffin to 
remain in his part-time job at the office where he expected to work 
full-time upon passing the bar examination. Employment prospects in 
many industries were down, and Mr. Griffin had spent the last several 
years cultivating his legal resume. Without a bar license, he would 
have had an especially difficult time finding another legal job. 
Moreover, although he had previously worked as a stockbroker, in 
 
 132. State Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/loan_repayment_assistance_ 
programs/state_loan_repayment_assistance_programs.html last updated Sept. 21, 2012 
[hereinafter ABA, State]. 
 133. Id. Some LRAPs are administered by the state bar association, while others are 
administered by non-profit organizations. Id. Funding also differs across states. Some state 
legislatures appropriate funds for their LRAP; Others rely on Interest on Lawyer Trust Account 
(IOLTA) funds. Id.  
 134. Id. 
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2008 those positions were neither as lucrative nor as readily available 
as in years prior. 
Furthermore, even if the Court felt that a decision to pursue other 
employment would have been more prudent, courts should not dictate 
career decisions for people based on their financial circumstances. 
Career choices are highly personal and reflect more than economics. 
Indeed, this precept is so fundamental that the courts have found the 
pursuit of one’s chosen profession to be protected by the Due Process 
Clause.
135
 While it is fair to require a debtor to make reasonable 
efforts to repay his or her debt, especially those who are delinquent, 
the Court’s decision here goes far beyond deciding whether Mr. 
Griffin made reasonable efforts at repayment and infringes upon Mr. 
Griffin’s right to autonomy in making decisions about his career and 
lifestyle.  
The Griffin decision is also hard to reconcile with other courts’ 
treatment of more serious character flaws. Here, the Court prevented 
Mr. Griffin from practicing law because his financial situation made 
him a risk for future misconduct. Yet courts have admitted applicants 
with criminal convictions and have allowed attorneys to keep their 
licenses despite actually engaging in fraudulent conduct.
136
  
The Court should also have viewed Mr. Griffin’s debt and his 
employment prospects in the context of the current legal job market 
and average law student debt levels. Mr. Griffin’s situation is not 
exceptional when considering the economic climate at the time. 
While some might argue that the depressed legal job market is so 
poor that most people who pursue a legal career today are making 
risky, irresponsible decisions, this argument is too sweeping to justify 
exclusion from the profession on character and fitness grounds. At 
any rate this argument would not apply to Mr. Griffin, who entered 
law school in 2005, before most people were aware of the associated 
risks of pursuing legal education. Furthermore, it’s not clear that 
anyone who applied to law school in this depressed legal job market 
can be faulted for their decision. Substantial systemic barriers, such 
as less than transparent rankings reports and job-placement data 
 
 135. See Dent, 129 U.S. 114. 
 136. See supra notes 105–06. 
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released by law schools, prevent potential students from being fully 
informed about whether a law degree is a wise investment.
137
  
Additionally, the Court should have given more consideration to 
Mr. Griffin’s pursuit of a public service career. Public policy supports 
encouraging law graduates to go into public service work, as 
evidenced by federal public interest loan forgiveness programs.
138
 In 
fact, Mr. Griffin’s pursuit of public interest employment should 
actually be seen as evidence of his good moral character. In addition, 
the fact that Mr. Griffin would be able to qualify for those assistance 
programs should have been considered, as it would enable him to 
repay his debts much more easily and quickly. The failure to 
recognize these sources of assistance subverts the government’s 
purpose in creating loan forgiveness programs. The message to 
students is that they should not plan to pursue public interest work 
upon graduation unless they are among the lucky few who have little 
to no debt. Apart from discouraging students from sacrificing for the 
public good, this message would reserve such jobs for the 
independently wealthy. 
Ironically, the Court’s decision served only to exacerbate Mr. 
Griffin’s debt problems. Without admission to the bar, Mr. Griffin’s 
ability to gain legal employment and repay his debt is severely 
limited. To be sure, courts are not obligated to help applicants 
become financially sound. But when looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court’s concern that Mr. Griffin would not be able 
to repay his debt would be better addressed if the Court granted Mr. 
Griffin admission to the bar. Had he been able to take the bar exam 
again, and, assuming he were to pass, he was practically guaranteed a 
full-time public defender position.
139
 With a public defender salary 
 
 137. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 139. Telephone Interview with Eric Brehm, Esq., Licensed Practicing Attorney, Brehm & 
Assocs., LPA (Oct. 15, 2012). While the record of Mr. Griffin’s hearing in front of the panel of 
the Ohio Board has been sealed, an interview with his attorney at the time revealed 
representations from Mr. Griffin’s employers at the public defender office that he would be 
hired full-time upon his passing the bar. Mr. Brehm stated that this information had been shared 
with the panel members. Id.  
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and access to IBR and PSLF programs, Mr. Griffin’s plan to repay 
his debt was both a reasonable and fairly common one.
140
  
B. Character and Fitness Rules Need Revision 
1. Uniformity of Character and Fitness Standards 
The history of the character and fitness rules and the unjust 
outcomes they produce, illustrated by Mr. Griffin’s case, suggest that 
the standards need to be revised. There are two major problems with 
the current rules. First, it is unclear whether the rules effectuate the 
purposes for which they were created—to protect the public and 
preserve the public image of the guild. Second, the definition of 
“good moral character” is vague, leading to inconsistent application 
within and between states. These vagueness issues deny applicants 
notice of which behaviors will obstruct admission to the bar.  
Moving toward a more uniform set of standards would help 
minimize inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes, like the outcome 
in Mr. Griffin’s case.141 While professional licensing is not in the 
federal domain, the legal community should make efforts to improve 
upon the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners and 
produce more detailed model rules, with extensive examples, as is 
done in other areas of the law, such as with the Model Penal Code or 
in restatements.
142
 One specific feature that should become uniform is 
that all states should allow conditional, or qualified, acceptance 
procedures.
143
 This will help to reduce arbitrary outcomes because 
examiners will be able to decide difficult cases within this 
 
 140. The options available to Mr. Griffin were through federal IBR and PSLF programs; 
although Ohio offers a state LRAP, public defenders are not eligible. See ABA, State, supra 
note 132. 
 141. Many scholars and organizations have advocated for a more uniform national 
standard. See, e.g., Marcus Ratcliff, Note, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for a 
Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L.J. 487, 488, 512 (2000); (see GUIDE, supra note 43, at 
vii). But cf. Rhode, supra note 24, at 588–89 (discussing undertaking more bright-line 
regulation of moral character and the potential for problems of both over-inclusiveness and 
under-inclusiveness).  
 142. See Ratcliff, supra note 141, at 512. 
 143. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
330 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:305 
 
 
framework. This procedure will also help to continue to address the 
bar’s concern for protecting the public from unfit attorneys. 
2. Addressing Student Loan Debt 
To better address notice and fairness concerns in character and 
fitness cases like Mr. Griffin’s, this Note offers four specific 
recommendations. First, states should explicitly require reviewing 
committees to consider the applicant in the context of the current 
legal employment market and student debt levels when they base 
character and fitness determinations on student debt. To that end, 
committee members should be required to stay informed about 
current trends, just as practicing lawyers are generally required to 
stay current through Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credits. This 
continuing instruction should include remaining current on the costs 
of legal education, average and local student debt levels, the legal job 
market, and federal loan repayment programs. 
Second, as the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the 
ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar have 
suggested, members of bar examining authorities should be appointed 
for staggered terms to enhance diversity of views.
144
 At least one 
member should be from a class that graduated in the preceding three 
years. In addition to these temporal requirements, there should also 
be diversity in members’ professional backgrounds, where at least 
some members have professional experience in public interest work.  
Another option is the formation of peer review boards. These 
boards would be comprised of recent graduates with more familiarity 
with the market for entry-level jobs and the current state of student 
debt levels. Applicants who have received adverse decisions could 
elect to receive de novo review by a peer review board, which may be 
better able to judge the effects of the current job market, and whether 
a board’s decision has failed to consider relevant circumstances.  
Third, whenever student debt and/or a graduate’s ability to repay 
his or her debt is at issue because of the person’s pursuit of public 
interest employment, the reviewer should consciously consider the 
 
 144. See supra, notes 48 and 49.  
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graduate’s public interest repayment options.145 State rules should 
explicitly identify public policies related to legal employment, such 
as those encouraging graduates to pursue public interest careers, and 
include these objectives among the factors relevant to a character and 
fitness determination. 
Fourth, states should set a debt level that is presumptively 
reasonable. This may be an exact figure, such as the current average 
level of debt in the area. A national debt average, for example, would 
suggest a level around $98,500.
146
 Or, states could provide a formula 
for bar examiners to apply, which could involve calculations based 
on the applicant’s student debt, any other debt, their financial 
obligations, and their employment or other income prospects. As a 
presumption, courts would retain discretion to disapprove an 
applicant if they found other factors affected the character 
determination. This approach would provide prospective students 
with clear notice of both their likelihood of getting a return on their 
investment and how much they can safely borrow.  
CONCLUSION 
When the Ohio State Supreme Court upheld the state bar’s 
decision to deny Hassan Jonathan Griffin admission to the bar on 
character and fitness grounds for having an insufficient plan to repay 
his student debt, it prompted a timely question: how should courts 
balance the importance of assuring the financial reliability and 
responsibility of future attorneys against the realities of high tuition 
levels, rising student debt, serious shortages of legal jobs, and the 
need for public interest lawyers? 
This Note proposes that state bars should move towards a more 
uniform set of character and fitness standards to prevent inconsistent 
and unjust decisions, like the Ohio State Supreme Court’s decision to 
deny Mr. Griffin admission to the bar due to financial hardship. 
 
 145. Because much of the record of the Board’s review of Mr. Griffin’s case has been 
sealed, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the Board considered his public interest repayment 
options. One of Mr. Griffin’s attorneys, however, stated that this matter had been discussed 
with the panel. Yet the Court makes no mention of it upon its review of the Board’s 
recommendation. See Telephone Interview with Eric Brehm, Esq., supra note 45.  
 146. See supra note 112. 
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Among these uniform standards should be explicit rules about how to 
properly consider student loan debt when assessing applicants’ 
character and fitness requirements.  
Examiners must consider applicants within the context of the 
current legal employment market and debt levels, with specific 
formulas in place that provide presumptions of reasonable borrowing. 
Furthermore, examiners must base their decisions on factors that 
reflect avowed policy interests in public service work. An applicant’s 
decision to pursue a public interest career should not be treated as 
evidence of irresponsible borrowing. Rather, one’s pursuit of public 
interest employment should be seen as evidence of good moral 
character. Examiners should also consider how federal loan 
forgiveness programs impact—and often improve—an applicant’s 
financial stability. Finally, examiners should be drawn from a more 
diverse group of lawyers from a variety of professional backgrounds. 
Reforming the character and fitness process in these ways will enable 
states to address concerns about professionalism in the law while 
providing for fair and predictable outcomes for law graduates. 
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